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In ﬁnancial markets, banks operate as intermediaries between borrowers
and suppliers of funds, and as such have to compete in two markets: for col-
lecting deposits on the one hand and for attracting loan applicants on the
other. In addition to this dual nature, largely overlooked in the literature
on credit markets, competition in the banking industry is characterized by
an oligopolistic structure, with a small number of ﬁrms controlling a large
part of the activities. This situation, resulting from intensive mergers in the
last two decades, suggests that strategic interactions between banks would
need to be accounted for, which is again rarely the case in the literature on
credit and deposit markets.1 In particular, the modeling of competition in
the deposit market either is ignored,2 or takes the extreme forms of perfect
or monopoly competition. Besides its dual and oligopolistic competitive
features, ﬁnancial markets are also characterized by asymmetric informa-
tion. Despite banks’ expertise in assessing the quality of borrowers and in
monitoring them, there still remain problems of adverse selection and moral
hazard in the credit market.
The present paper incorporates the three important features described
above, by modelling double-sided oligopolistic competition among banks in
the deposit and credit market, with adverse selection in the loan market.
We analyze diﬀerent versions of a model of dual Bertrand competition -
in which banks choose both their credit and deposit interest rates - with
homogenous deposits and loans among banks. The main objective of this
paper is to contribute to a theory of interest rates determination with ﬁnan-
cial intermediation when double-sided Bertrand competition prevails. The
dual nature of competition raises a speciﬁc problem as it potentially gener-
ates two opposite mechanisms: Bertrand competition in the credit market
alone would imply an undercutting war, with the loan rate falling to the de-
posit rate, whereas price competition in the deposit market would push the
deposit interest rate up to the loan rate. The question is to determine which
credit and deposit rates will then result from these two opposing forces.
1For an overview of the diﬀerent forms of competition in banking theory, see Bhat-
tacharya and Thakor [1] and Freixas and Rochet [4].
2Many papers assume that banks collect an exogenous amount of deposits (see, eg, the
review of reserve management and portfolio models by Santomero [8]) or face an inﬁnite
supply of funds at a given deposit rate.
1This paper follows Repullo [7] and Yanelle [14] in assuming double-sided
Bertrand competition in the banking sector. Both have analyzed simultane-
ous competition in the deposit and the credit markets under the assumption
that banks are compelled to accept and remunerate all deposits supplied by
the public. In this paper we relax the assumption of simultaneous competi-
tion, on the grounds that the timing of a game could aﬀect its outcome. The
paper therefore raises the speciﬁc question of the determination of interest
rates with regard to the timing of competition in the two markets: does
the order of competition matter? To answer that question we carry out the
analysis for games in which competition is not simultaneous in both mar-
kets, contrary to Repullo [7] and Yanelle [14], but takes place at diﬀerent
stages: banks commit themselves to the rates on one market before com-
peting in the other market. We develop two sequential games, respectively
called the ‘Deposits-ﬁrst’ and ‘Loans-ﬁrst’ games, depending on whether
intermediaries compete ﬁrst for depositors or for loan applicants.
This two-stage competition is familiar from goods market intermediation
theory, as developed by Stahl [10].3 Stahl’s framework has been adapted to
ﬁnancial intermediation by Freixas and Rochet [4], who kept all the assump-
tions of the original paper by assuming homogeneous goods (here homoge-
neous deposits and homogeneous loans among banks) and a winner-take-
it-all sharing rule.4 In Stahl [10] and Freixas and Rochet [4] intermediaries
commit to the quantities oﬀered (or demanded) by the customers in the ﬁrst
market visited. We believe that this commitment to quantity is actually the
force that drives the prices, rather than the sequence in price-setting. In
order to isolate the eﬀects due to the commitment to the prices, the present
paper assumes that, although banks commit themselves to the rates posted
in the ﬁrst market, they do not take any decision with respect to the quan-
tity they trade before competing in the second market and they can possi-
bly reject some customers from the ﬁrst market. This non-commitment to
quantity represents the distinctive feature of our model with respect to the
original model, and also departs from Repullo [7] and Yanelle [14], which
impose the acceptance of all deposits by banks as an assumption. We prefer
to endogeneise this feature as the consequence of credit rationing at equi-
3See Spulber [9] for a review of the intermediation theory of the ﬁrm.
4Among the extensions of the original model, let us mention Toolselma [12], which
introduces reserve requirement in the Freixas and Rochet’s framework, or Gottardi and
Yanelle [5], which models ﬁnancial innovations as spatial competition.
2librium. Another important diﬀerence in our modelling is the possibility for
customers to reapply to another intermediary if rejected, an aspect which
could not be captured in the other papers due to their assumption of accep-
tation of all customers.
In this new framework, our main result is that timing of competition
matters when borrowers and depositors can apply at most to one bank,
whereas it does not have any eﬀect and is equivalent to simultaneous com-
p e t i t i o ni nt h ec a s eo fm u l t i p l ea p p l i c a t i o n s ,w h i c hw eb e l i e v ei sam o r e
realistic case.
In the single-application framework analyzed in the ﬁrst part of the pa-
per, the diﬀerence in the timing of moves turns out to be important, gen-
erating two diﬀerent polar outcomes. The ﬁrst market visited is also the
market in which competition is ﬁerce, as the banks which do not manage
to capture customers in the ﬁrst stage will eventually be out of business.
The timing therefore determines which force drives the deposit and loan
rates. When banks make their deposit rate oﬀer before their credit rate of-
fer (‘Deposits-ﬁrst’ game), the Subgame Perfect Nash equilibrium is located
at the highest deposit rate compatible with banks’ proﬁtability. For lower
deposit rates, any bank would have an incentive to oﬀer a deposit rate higher
than its competitors in order to get a monopoly rent in the credit market.
At the opposite, when credit rate oﬀers are made before deposit rate oﬀers
(‘Loans-ﬁrst’ game), competition drives the credit rate and the deposit rate
down to their lowest value compatible with banking activity.
When multiple applications by borrowers and depositors are introduced
into the game, as is the case in the second part of the paper, the two po-
lar outcomes still apply but are not sensitive to the timing in competition.
I n d e e d ,e v e nw i t hd i ﬀerent orderings in the visits to the markets by banks
(‘Deposits-ﬁrst’ or ‘Loans-ﬁrst’), games characterized by the same assump-
tions for the mobility of depositors and borrowers converge to the same
outcome, one of the polar equilibrium derived in the ﬁr s tp a r to ft h ep a p e r .
The possibility for multiple applications in one market weakens competition
in that market in favour of competition in the other market. If borrowers
are the only agents to be allowed to apply elsewhere when rejected, or if
they reapply before depositors, Bertrand competition in deposit and credit
markets, regardless of the timing, gives the outcome of our ‘Deposits-ﬁrst’
game in the single application framework, which drives the deposit rate up
3to its highest value. Even when the credit market is visited ﬁrst, competi-
tion in the loan market is not ﬁerce anymore, as banks can get borrowers
l a t e ri nt h eg a m ea n dc a ne v e nb em o r ea g g r e s s i v ei nt h ed e p o s i tm a r k e t
later if they have posted a larger credit rate. When a bank manages to cap-
ture all deposits in the second market, it is guaranteed to get all borrowers
even with a non-attractive price, simply through the rejection process by
competitors without lending capacities. Competition in the deposit market
therefore becomes crucial and drives the interest rates upwards. If, on the
contrary, depositors are the only agents to be allowed to move from bank to
bank, or if they can reapply before borrowers, double-sided Bertrand com-
petition gives the outcome of the ‘Loans-ﬁrst’ game in a single-application
framework, and the interest rates are driven down to their lowest value,
regardless the sequence of competition.
In this paper we assume that the loan market displays adverse selection
as in Stiglitz and Weiss [11]. This is captured by a non-monotonic relation-
ship between loan rate and the expected rate of return of a bank. Adverse
selection therefore provides a justiﬁcation for an upper bound on the deposit
rate that banks can post. It is important to note that this assumption of
asymmetric information is not essential for the theory of determination of
interest rates in dual competition that we develop in this paper. In particu-
lar, adverse selection does not have any speciﬁc interaction with the double
Bertrand competition process that we model here. Our motivation is simply
to illustrate, with the case of Stiglitz and Weiss’ framework of adverse selec-
tion, how the modelling of dual competition can shed a new light on existing
results in the literature on credit markets. We show that Stiglitz and Weiss’
result on credit rationing indeed depends on a speciﬁc characterization of
competition, where competition in the deposit market is the driving force.
Credit rationing may emerge in both types of equilibria that we have
derived but the phenomenon is much more likely to occur and at a larger
scale in the game in which the credit market competition is ﬁercer, i.e.,
either when the credit market is the ﬁrst market to be visited in the single-
application framework, or when depositors can reapply to another bank
before borrowers. More interestingly, explaining credit rationing thanks to
adverse selection — as Stiglitz and Weiss do in their paper — may not always
be relevant when oligopolistic competition in the deposit market is explicitly
taken into account. Credit rationing can be traced back to asymmetric
4information only in games for which deposit competition dominates (as in
the ‘Deposits-ﬁrst’ game with single application). When competition in the
credit market is ﬁerce, a credit rationing of another nature emerges which
has no connection with imperfect information at all.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 brieﬂy presents the model.
In Section 3, we develop sequential games within a single-application frame-
work. We analyze the game in which banks compete ﬁrst for funds and
then for projects (‘Deposits-ﬁrst’ game) in Section 3.1. The reverse order
of moves (‘Loans-ﬁrst’ game) is studied in Section 3.2. A discussion of the
single-application results takes place in Section 3.3. Section 4 is dedicated
to the framework with multiple applications by depositors and borrowers,
with an analysis of a rationing scheme which enhances the competition in
the credit market in Section 4.1. Another rationing scheme, stimulating
competition in the deposit market, is analysed in Section 4.2 and Section
4.3 discusses our results and relates them to the existing literature. We sum-
marize our results in Section 5. All proofs are relegated to the appendix.
2 The model
Section 2 brieﬂy presents the main assumptions of the model. The paper
considers an intermediated credit market where funds holders can only lend
to borrowers through banks.5 Banks are modelled in a stylized way that
captures the essence of ﬁnancial intermediation: they collect funds through
‘deposits’ that are remunerated and use these funds by making ‘loans’ that
provide them with a revenue. As the paper does not focus on problems
of maturity transformation, we assume for simplicity that the liabilities
and the assets in the banks’ balance sheet have the same maturity. The
market structure is an oligopoly and takes the form of N (≥ 2)b a n k si
(i ∈ B = {1,2,....,N}) that play strategically. Banks are assumed to be
risk neutral and compete à la Bertrand on both the credit market and the
deposit market. Since this double-sided Bertrand competition is really the
core of this paper and takes various forms, a precise description of the game
and the players’ moves is given for each new model. Let us simply point
out here the traditional assumption underlying any Bertrand competition
5For models where customers can choose between intermediaries and direct ﬁnance,
see Yanelle [16].
5analysis. Banks prefer activity, even if it leads to a zero expected proﬁt, to
no activity at all.
Borrowers are assumed to be atomless and are not strategic players in
the market. We assume that they are myopic and simply apply to the bank
that oﬀers the most attractive price. Although it is not necessary for our
theory of determination of interest rates, we assume that the expected re-
turn which banks get from their loans, ER, is not a monotonous increasing
function of the posted credit rate, rL. W ea s s u m et h a tt h ee x p e c t e dr e -
turn is a hump-shaped curve, with a peak at the credit interest rate ˜ rL as
illustrated in Figure 1. The characteristics of ER can be explained by as-
suming heterogeneous borrowers and asymmetric information, as in Stiglitz
and Weiss [11]. Borrowers have diﬀerent probabilities of project success
and hence loan repayment. Information is asymmetric, as banks are unable
to distinguish diﬀerent borrowers and therefore must treat them equally.
The borrowers with a higher probability of success have a smaller expected
proﬁt as they repay their loan with a greater probability and thus must leave
the credit market for a lower credit rate. This characteristic is the core of
the well-known adverse selection phenomenon, by which an increase in the
posted credit rate deteriorates the quality of the applicant pool as the best
customers leave the market ﬁrst. After a certain credit rate, denoted ˜ rL in
Figure 1, the deterioration in the quality oﬀsets the beneﬁcial eﬀect of the
increase in the payments, hence a decrease in ER and a general hump shape
for the curve. At rmax
L , the worst borrowers leave the credit market and for
larger credit rate, there is no applicants for loan.
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
The demand for credit is a monotonic decreasing function of the credit
rate. However, the demand for credit is represented as a backward bending
curve when drawn with respect to ER. See Figure 2 for an illustration.
Depositors are also atomless and are not strategic players in the game. We
assume that they are myopic and simply apply to the bank that oﬀers the
most attractive price. They are assumed to be endowed with only one unit of
funds. They have diﬀerent reservation values, so that the aggregate supply
of funds to the banking sector, SD, is an increasing function of the deposit
rate rD. Below the smallest reservation value, rmin
D , the supply of deposits
6is zero.6 See Figure 2 for an illustration of two possible conﬁgurations for
the aggregate supply of funds.
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]
The Walrasian equilibrium is either on the upward slope of the expected
return as for S
0




The following sections consider sequential competition in a single-application
framework (Section 3) and in a multiple-application framework (Section 4).
3 Sequential competition in a single-application
framework
In section 3.1 competition for deposits will take place before loans whereas
in section 3.2 the reverse will happen. We discuss our results derived in a
single-application framework in section 3.3.
3.1 ‘Deposits-ﬁrst’ game: Competition for deposits before
competition for borrowers
a. Description of the ‘Deposits-ﬁrst’ game
In this section we consider the following game:
Stage 1. Banks compete for deposits. Each bank i oﬀers a deposit rate ri
D,
which cannot be revised later in the game.
Stage 2. Depositors observe all banks’ price oﬀers. Each depositor can
apply to one bank at most. These oﬀers are registered by banks which
retain the right to accept or to reject them later.
Stage 3. Banks observe all gross deposit rates ri
D and all depositors’ ac-
tions. Banks, if provided with funds holders applicants, then compete
for loan applicants by making a price oﬀer. Bank i posts the credit
rate ri
L, which cannot be revised later in the game.
6rmin
D can also be interpreted as an outside option available to all deposi-
tors.
7Stage 4. Borrowers observe all banks’ price oﬀers and each applies to one
bank at most.
Stage 5. Each bank i then uses the following rationing rule: the amount
borrowed from depositors and lent to the borrowers, Li,i st h em i n i -
mum between the deposits that bank i can attract, Si
D,a n dt h ed e -
mand for credit it faces, Di
L. Borrowers or depositors who registered
an oﬀer necessarily carry out their plan if the bank accepts their of-
fer. Agents in excess (either depositors or borrowers) are rejected at
random by banks and we assume for the time being that they cannot
reapply to another bank.
Although banks compete in the deposit market ﬁrst and commit them-
selves to the deposit rates posted, they do not take any decision with respect
to the amount of deposits they accept before competing in the loan mar-
ket: the decision by banks to reject some agents takes place after both
markets have been visited. This aspect of the game is a key diﬀerence
from Stahl’s [10] model of intermediation in the goods market and from the
Freixas and Rochet [4] model of ﬁnancial intermediation, whereall customers
in the ﬁrst market are accepted.
Note that no additional price oﬀers are made to these rejected agents.
Notice also that banks without deposits after stage 2 do not make any price
oﬀer at stage 3. This seems a reasonable assumption given that there is no
way to get funds later in the game. This assumption will be discussed in
section 3.3 and relaxed later when rejected depositors are allowed to move
to another bank (section 4).
Throughout the paper we assume that borrowers and depositors are
atomless and myopic agents who systematically apply for the most attractive
rate, regardless of their probability of being rejected. This is the standard
assumption made in the literature on Bertrand-Edgeworth competition. 7
In addition, when depositors or borrowers are indiﬀerent between applying
to one bank or another, they distribute themselves so that there is an “equal
split” of depositors or borrowers among all banks posting the same rate.8
7See Vives[13] chapter 5 for a review of models of Bertrand and Edgeworth.
8One can object that unless there is a centralised system, the choice of a bank even
made at random will not lead to an equal split of customers among banks. Nevertheless,
banks have no choice but reasoning on average, and in average terms there is an equal
split for price tie.
8Consequently, the supply of deposits Sj
D that a bank j faces when posting
ad e p o s i tr a t erj








D with K = {i ∈ B;rj
D = ri
D}
and where SD is the aggregate supply of deposits;
Sj
D =0 otherwise.
The demand for loans Dj
L that a bank j faces when posting a credit rate
rj








L with H = {i ∈ B;rj
L = ri
L}
and where DL is the aggregate demand for loans;
Dj
D =0 otherwise.
As only banks with lending capacities have access to the loan market, a
key feature of the game is that whenever one bank posts the highest deposit
rate, it captures all deposits and gets a monopoly position in the credit
market.
The expected proﬁt of a bank i which posts the rates ri
L and ri
D ,w h e n
the competitors post rj
L and rj

















Li =m i n {Si
D,Di
L}. (2)
The competition which we model is deﬁnitely not pure Bertrand com-
petition: in one-sided pure Bertrand competition the price-setting ﬁrm is
assumed to be able to satisfy the whole demand whereas in our approach
the amount of loans in the credit market is constrained by the amount of
deposits collected by the bank, so that the demand for credit may be ra-
tioned. Consequently, in our models there is a sort of capacity constraint
due to the deposit constraint which makes the type of competition analyzed
here closer to Edgeworth-Bertrand competition. However, contrary to the
standard literature on Edgeworth-Bertrand competition, capacities here are
not exogenously given.
Given that banks observe the constellation of deposit rates at stage 3, a
bank’ strategy is composed of one deposit rate and a set of credit rates, one
9for each possible deposit-rate constellation. The game exhibits subgames
corresponding to banks’ intervention in the credit market and the related
applications by the borrowers. The game is solved by backward induction
and our objective is to characterize the subgame perfect Nash equilibria
(hereafter SPNE) of the game: we ﬁrst consider the banks’ credit rate oﬀers
at stage 3 for each possible combination of deposit rates (and the associated
supplies of deposits resulting from the optimal decision of depositors) when
the banks anticipate the optimal decision by borrowers. The following step
is the study of banks’ deposit rate oﬀers at stage 1, taking into account the
equilibria we will have found for the credit market subgames.
b. Stage 3: The credit market subgame
Here we analyze only the two relevant conﬁgurations: the ﬁrst where all
banks oﬀer the same deposit rate and thus have an equal share of funds;
the second is a situation in which one bank oﬀers a deposit rate higher than
the other banks.9The deposit rate rD — the highest posted rate — leads to
an aggregate deposit supply SD(rD), which is either split equally among
all banks if they post the same deposit rate, or captured entirely by the
bank with the highest rate. When one bank captures all deposits, this
bank becomes a monopolist in the loan market and charges the monopolist
credit rate. In the case where all banks post the same deposit rate, the
following subgames are typically situations à la Edgeworth, i.e., Bertrand
competition in the credit market with capacity constraints (each bank having
an equal share of the funds) and constant marginal cost (equal to the deposit
rate). Let us denote by r
MC
L (where the superscript MC stands for “market
clearing”) the gross credit rate which would clear the credit market for
a supply of credit equal to the funds provided at rD .T h i s m e a n s t h a t
SD(rD)=DL(r
MC
L ). The higher the deposit factor, the lower the market-
clearing credit rate. Let us denote by r
ZUP
L the lowest credit factor leading





L is located on the upward-sloping portion of ER, the higher the deposit
rate, the higher the zero unit proﬁtc r e d i tr a t e .
9We present only these two conﬁgurations for the following reasons. An equilibrium
happens to be a constellation in which all banks oﬀer the same deposit rate. The con-
stellations in which one bank oﬀers a deposit rate higher than all the others (the latter
being equal) will be useful for analyzing the deviations. They will help to show which
constellation, among those displaying identical rates, will be the equilibrium.
10Three cases must be analyzed for the subgames, as they give rise to
diﬀerent Nash equilibrium (henceforth NE) outcomes in the credit market.





L and ˜ rL.
Proposition 1 (‘Deposits-ﬁrst’ game: Equilibria in Credit Market Sub-
games)
1. When all banks post the same deposit rate rD l o w e rt h a no re q u a lt o
ER(˜ rL) − 1,
(i) if r
MC
L > ˜ rL, the continuum of NE in the subgame is the interval h
r
ZUP
L , ˜ rL
i
. The bank proﬁt maximizing NE is ˜ rL and is charac-
terized by credit rationing;
(ii) if r
MC
L ≤ ˜ rL and ER(r
MC
L ) ≥ 1+rD,t h ec o n t i n u u mo fN Ei nt h e








.T h eb a n kp r o ﬁt maximizing
NE is r
MC
L and is characterized by credit market clearing;
(iii) if r
MC
L < ˜ rL and ER(r
MC
L ) < 1+rD, the unique NE in the
subgame is r
ZUP
L , which gives rise to deposit rationing.
2. When one bank oﬀers a deposit rate higher than its competitors’, the
equilibrium of the subgame is the monopolistic credit rate, which is ˜ rL
with credit rationing in conﬁguration (i), a rate between r
MC
L and ˜ rL
generating deposit rationing in conﬁguration (ii), and a rate between
r
ZUP
L and ˜ rL in conﬁguration (iii) with deposit rationing.
The Nash equilibria are characterized by non-negative expected proﬁt
(credit rate larger or equal to r
ZUP
L ), are located on the upward-sloping por-
tion of ER and cannot exhibit both deposit rationing and positive expected
proﬁt. Equilibria can be characterized by positive expected proﬁti fc r e d i t
is rationed. Indeed Bertrand competition in the credit market does not al-
ways result in an incentive for any bank to undercut its competitors’ prices.
Here, due to the capacity constraint represented by the deposit endowment
inherited from the ﬁrst two stages of the game, a positive proﬁt( a si nc a s e s
( i )a n d( i i ) )c a nb et h eo u t c o m eo ft h ec r e d i tm a r k e ts u b g a m e .I ti si n d e e d
unproﬁtable for a bank to attract borrowers through a cut in its credit rate
if it has no funds available to face the additional demand. This is the usual
11result in an Edgeworth-Bertrand framework.10 In contrast, this decrease
i nt h ec r e d i tr a t ei sa l w a y sp r o ﬁtable when there is initially an excess of
deposits with positive expected proﬁt.
Among the range of all possible NE for cases (i) and (ii), the highest
credit rate is proﬁt maximizing for banks, as it provides all banks with the
highest expected return, for the same amount of loans (equal to the binding
supply of funds).





L decreases. For the highest deposit rate compatible with
banking activities, rD = g ER(rL) − 1, all cases give the same unique NE
r
ZUP
L =˜ rL which can exhibit either credit or deposit rationing. Let now refer
to the two conﬁgurations illustrated in Figure 2. One can see that with a
deposit supply curve like S
0
D, the credit market is successively switching from
case (i) to case (ii) and then from case (ii) to case (iii) with the increase in the
deposit rate. With S”
D, although the deposit rate increases, the credit market
remains always in case (i), even for the highest deposit rate rD = g ER(rL)−1.
c. Stage 1: Competition for funds
We now consider the ﬁrst two stages of the game, using the outcomes of
the credit market subgames analyzed in the previous subsection. What is
the outcome of competition for deposits among banks, when they anticipate
the related outcome in the credit market? The following proposition states
that the banks must post the highest possible deposit rate.
Proposition 2 (SPNE in ‘Deposits-ﬁrst’ game) The SPNE are character-
ized by all banks posting the same deposit rate equal to ER(˜ rL)−1 and the
same credit rate ˜ rL.F o ro ﬀ-equilibrium subgames, credit rates are deﬁned as
in Proposition 1. This SPNE can lead to credit rationing, deposit rationing,
or (very fortuitously) to credit market clearing.
As there is a continuum of NE in oﬀ-equilibrium subgames, there is also
a continuum of SPNE in the game. However they are all characterized by
the same outcome at equilibrium.
10Notice that we do not face any problem of existence of equilibrium as in the traditional
Edgeworth framework because borrowers rejected by a bank here cannot move to another
one, so that a deviation through an increase in the credit rate is never proﬁtable.
12Competition in the deposit market drives the deposit rate up to its high-
est value, compatible with proﬁtability. Indeed if the deposit rate were not at
this highest level, any bank would then have the incentive to oﬀer a slightly
higher deposit rate in order to capture the whole deposit market and then
reach a monopoly position in the credit market.An equilibrium must conse-
quently display a deposit rate so high that this mechanism of pushing the
rate up cannot operate any longer. As the top of ER constitutes a ceiling
for the deposit rate, this is the level at which the deposit rate will be set at
equilibrium.11
Proposition 2 predicts the emergence of deposit rationing for S
0
D,a s
Bertrand competition drives the deposit rate above the Walrasian level. In
the double-sided Bertrand competition, a deviation through an increase in
the deposit rate can never be made unproﬁtable because of a binding demand
for credit. Indeed, the increase in the deposit rate raises not only the amount
of funds available to the deviating bank but also the demand for credit that
it faces, due to the monopoly position.
Credit rationing is a possible outcome of the game, when S”
D prevails.
The case with credit rationing is illustrated in Figure 3.
[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE]
Among the borrowers rejected because of a lack of funds, most of them
would have been strictly better oﬀ with the loan.
3.2 ‘Loans-ﬁrst’ game: Competition for borrowers before
competition for funds
a. The description of the ‘Loans-ﬁrst’ game
In this section we consider a game which reverses the order of banks’
intervention in the deposit and credit markets. At stage 1, banks compete
for loans applicants and borrowers apply at stage 2. At stage 3, banks with
loan applicants compete in the deposit market and depositors apply at stage
4. The other characteristics of the game such as the sharing and rationing
11Through the rationing scheme, the amount of deposits remunerated by the banks is
always equal to the amount of loans they supply. The deposit factor can thus be driven
up to f ER without violating the condition of a non-negative total expected proﬁt.
13rules remain unchanged. Given that banks observe the constellation of credit
rates at stage 3, a bank’ strategy is composed of one credit rate and a set
of deposit rates, one for each possible credit rates constellation.
Given the access condition to the deposit market, a bank which manages
to capture all borrowers at stage 2 gets a monopoly position in the deposit
market.
b. Stage 3: The funds market subgame
Here we only analyze two conﬁgurations: one in which all banks oﬀer
the same credit rate and thus get an equal share of loan applicants, and a
second one where one bank posts a lower credit rate than its competitors
and captures the whole market. Let us assume that all banks (or the most
attractive bank if one bank charges a credit rate lower than its competitors)
post rL lower than rmax
L in order to guarantee a positive demand for credit.
The credit rate rL leads to the aggregate credit demand DL(rL).L e t u s
denote by rMC
D the deposit rate which, if posted by all banks, would clear
the deposit market: SD(r
MC
D )=DL(rL). Let us denote r
ZUP
D the deposit
factor which leads to a zero unit proﬁt: r
ZUP
D = ER(rL)− 1. The lower the
credit rate, the higher the market-clearing deposit rate and the lower the
zero unit proﬁt deposit rate (on the upward-sloping portion).





D . In the following proposition we deﬁne the Nash equilibria of
the subgames.
Proposition 3 (‘Loans-ﬁrst’ game: Equilibria in Deposit Market Subgames)
1. For subgames where all posted credit rates rL are the same, lower than
rmax













T h eb a n kp r o ﬁt maximizing NE is rMC




D ,t h eN Eo ft h es u b g a m ei srZUP
D .T h i sa m o u n t s
to credit rationing.
2. In the conﬁguration where one bank oﬀers a credit rate lower than
the one charged by its competitors, the equilibrium deposit rate is the
monopolistic one, which is a rate between rmin
D and r
MC




D in case (ii).
14Credit rationing combined with a positive expected proﬁti sr u l e do u ta s
NE since it would be proﬁtable for any bank to increase the deposit rate in
order to collect more funds and to lent more. Credit rationing could survive
only if the increase in the deposit rate would lead to a negative expected
proﬁt. Notice again that Bertrand competition in the deposit market does
not result in an incentive for any bank to overbid its competitors’ prices. A
positive proﬁt (as in case (i)) can be the outcome of the game, because the
demand for credit acts as a constraint.
c. Stage 1: Competition for loan applicants
We now consider the ﬁrst two stages of the game, using the outcomes
of the deposit market subgames analyzed in the previous subsection. Com-
petition in the credit market drives the credit rate down to its lowest value
compatible with banking activity.
Proposition 4 (SPNE in ‘Loans-ﬁrst’ game) The SPNE are composed of
ad e p o s i tr a t ermin
D and a credit rate on the upward-sloping portion of ER
such that ER(rL)=1+rmin
D .T h e o ﬀ-equilibrium-path deposit rates are
deﬁned as in Proposition 3. This SPNE can lead to credit rationing, to
deposit rationing, or (very fortuitously) to market clearing.
Again due to a continuum of NE in oﬀ-equilibrium subgames, there is
also a continuum of SPNE in the game. However they all are characterized
by the same outcome at equilibrium.
The case with credit rationing is illustrated in Figure 4.
[FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE]
The core of the argument is that if banks post a credit rate higher than
ER−1(1+ rmin
D ), any bank would have an incentive to oﬀer a slightly lower
credit rate to capture the whole loan market and be a monopolist in the
deposit market.
Credit rationing appears as a more likely outcome for this game than
for the previous one. Indeed, for a given demand-for-credit function and a
given supply-of-deposit function, the equilibrium in this game is necessarily
characterized by lower credit and deposit rates than in ‘Deposits-ﬁrst’ game.
15This implies that the demand for credit is larger than for the other game
whereas the supply of deposits is smaller. The gap between demand for
credit and supply of deposits is necessarily larger at the equilibrium of the
present game, giving credit rationing a higher chance to occur. As an illus-
tration, notice that with S
0
D credit rationing emerges in ‘Loans-ﬁrst’ game
but not in ‘Deposits-ﬁrst’ game.
Notice that credit rationing is now compatible with the application of
all borrowers in the credit market, in contrast to the previous game: if rmin
D
is low enough, the equilibrium loan rate may be lower than the reservation
value of the best borrowers, which guarantees that all types of borrowers
apply for a loan. In any case, the pool of loan applicants is always larger
and of better quality in this game than in ‘Deposits-ﬁrst’ game.
3.3 Discussion and implications of the single-application frame-
work
a. The role of the sequence of price-setting
We have shown in the previous sections that the two games in a single-
application framework generate two polar outcomes, illustrating that the
sequence in the price-setting, regardless the commitment in quantity in the
ﬁrst market, is crucial. Competition in the ﬁr s tm a r k e ti sﬁerce because post-
ing the best price in that market guarantees a monopolistic position in the
second market. In order to better understand the contribution of a sequen-
tial game, let us brieﬂy describe the outcome which would have emerged if
oﬀers had been made simultaneously, in a framework where borrowers again
cannot apply to another bank if rejected. When there is no mobility at all,
Nash equilibria are all pairs (rD,r L) characterized by a zero unit proﬁto n
the positive slope of ER between rD = rmin
D and rD = g ER− 1.12 The mul-
tiplicity of equilibria is due to the fact that a proﬁtable deviation requires
a more attractive interest rates in both markets, which becomes impossible
as long as the expected unit proﬁt is zero. In sequential games with a single
a p p l i c a t i o n ,am o r ea t t r a c t i v ei n t e r e s tr a t ei nt h eﬁr s tm a r k e ti ss u ﬃcient
12Ap o s i t i v ep r o ﬁt is not possible at equilibrium since a simultaneous increase of the
deposit rate and decrease of the credit rate allows the deviating bank to capture all deposits
and all borrowers, so that there is necessarily a discrete jump in the quantities which more
than oﬀsets the decrease in the unit proﬁt.
16for a bank to deviate, regardless of the other price. Deviating is therefore
made easier and only one outcome at equilibrium survives.
b. The access condition
The reader may wonder if the access condition that we have imposed
to the second market - a bank deprived of applicants on the ﬁrst market
cannot make a price oﬀer on the second market - is not directly responsible
for our result. We now discuss this point. At ﬁrst sight, the assumption of
an access condition to the second market is quite reasonable in a framework
where a bank without customers after the ﬁrst two stages have no way to
capture applicants later in the game. However, one cannot deny that the
banks without customers could decide to adopt a form of retaliation policy,
consisting in being very competitive in the second market. In subgames
where one bank captures all customers in the ﬁrst market one bank without
applicants could post a credit rate such that it gives an ER lower than the
highest deposit rate, driving the bank with all customers to no activity. The
deviations through a better price being disactivated in this way, both games
have a multiplicity of SPNE, consisting in all vectors with identical rates for
the ﬁrst market. The associated prices in the second market are then deﬁned
as in Proposition 1 (for ‘Deposits-ﬁrst’ game) or Proposition 3 (for ‘Loans-
ﬁrst’ game). Some SPNE would then admit a strictly positive expected
proﬁt. For a proof of this result, see Bracoud [3].13 The introduction of
more rational customers in the second market nevertheless could justify the
results that we have derived in the previous sections, even in the absence of
an access condition to the second market. If banks without customers after
the ﬁrst two stages of the game post a better price in the second market,
as part of a retaliation policy, customers in the second market may realize
that going for the best rate would imply being rejected with probability one.
They may therefore decide rationally to go for the bank with all customers
after the ﬁrst two stages of the game, even if the price posted by that
intermediary in the second market is less attractive. From that perspective,
our results described in Proposition 2 and 4 are robust to the removal of the
access condition to the second market.
13One could consider, in particular, that the collusion outcome of the game could be
sustained by such retaliatory policies from competitors.
17c. Credit rationing and asymmetric information
In Figure 3 and 4, we have illustrated that both games could generate
credit rationing. A major diﬀerence however between the two models is
that asymmetric information plays no role in generating the credit rationing
result in the second game, whereas it was essential in the ﬁrst one.
Asymmetric information is directly responsible for credit rationing, when
this phenomenon happens in ‘Deposits-ﬁrst’ game. In a symmetric frame-
work such a rationing would be ruled out. When banks can distinguish
among borrowers, the expected return for each type of borrower is mono-
tonically increasing in the credit rate charged to this type, up to the point
where this type of borrower decides to leave the credit market because his
investment becomes unproﬁtable. Competition in the deposit market at
the ﬁrst stage of the game would drive the deposit rate to its maximum
value, i.e. at the highest value of ER. Under Stiglitz and Weiss’ assumption
of common expected return for all project, this corresponds to the ER at
which all borrowers are indiﬀerent between applying for a loan and leaving
the market. In such a context even a shortage of funds cannot be interpreted
as credit rationing as loan applicants at this rate do not suﬀer from being
rejected.
In contrast in the loans-ﬁrst game, even if the expected return were a
strictly increasing function of the credit rate resulting from symmetric in-
formation, we would still get credit rationing. Competition in the credit
market in the ﬁrst stage of the game compels the banks to post the lowest
possible credit rate for every given type. The lowest credit rate for each
type of borrowers compatible with proﬁtable banking activities necessarily
corresponds to an expected return equal to rmin
D . The ‘loans-ﬁrst’ game
therefore suggests that credit rationing could be approached from a totally
diﬀerent perspective, independently of informational problems. Credit ra-
tioning could be the result of a tough Bertrand competition on the credit
market, rather than the consequence of asymmetric information.
Remark 1 (Credit rationing and adverse selection) In Stiglitz and Weiss’s
[11] framework, asymmetric information in the loan market is necessary to
generate credit rationing if and only if Bertrand competition in the deposit
market drives the interest rates. When Bertrand competition in the credit
market is the driving force, credit rationing may emerge without adverse
selection.
184 Multiple applications for borrowers and/or de-
positors
In section 3 we assumed that a borrower or a depositor could apply at
most to one bank. Now we consider multiple applications by borrowers
or depositors (equivalently referred to as ‘mobility’ hereafter), which we
believe is a more realistic assumption. At stage 2 or stage 4 of the game, the
depositors and/or the borrowers choose a list of banks whose order reﬂects
the sequence that agents will respect when they visit banks at stage 5 after
being rejected. We assume that depositors and/or borrowers can visit all
banks at no additional cost. The discussion on multiple applications requires
that we allow all banks to make a price oﬀer in the second market regardless
their performance in the ﬁrst one, as they can capture customers later in
the game.
In our multiple-application framework, the same polar outcomes as in
the single-application framework prevail. However, our major ﬁnding is
that the timing in the competition for deposits and loans is not the key
element any longer in explaining the emergence of one equilibrium rather
than the other. What really matters now is the speciﬁcation of the mobility
of the customers and the rationing scheme. The outcome will depend on
who among borrowers or depositors can reapply after being rejected, and if
both can, the crucial element will be the timing in the rejection of excess
depositors or excess borrowers.
The possibility for multiple applications aﬀects the banks’ behaviour as
a less attractive price can now attract a positive demand (or supply) from
rejected customers. The mobility of customers in only one market weakens
the competition in that market in favour of the competition in the other
market, regardless of the timing in competition. Put diﬀerently, multiple
applications in one market are equivalent, in terms of competition pressure,
to the case where competition on this market took place at a second stage in
the single-application framework. Competition in the market where there
is no mobility is ﬁerce as there is no way to catch these customers later,
and the capacity built up on that market may inﬂuence the ability to get
customers from the other market. When both depositors and borrowers
can reapply after rejection, the outcome depends on the speciﬁcation of the
rationing scheme, in particular the timing in the rejection process. When
19rejection takes place in two diﬀerent stages for borrowers and depositors,
reapplication by those in the second group would be totally inoperative and
superﬂuous since they are bound to be subsequently rejected by all other
banks. This implies that in the following analysis of multiple applications
we only need to consider the mobility of the ﬁrst group to be rejected.
4.1 Multiple applications with excess depositors rejected ﬁrst
To begin with, let us assume that excess depositors are the only to be rejected
or are rejected ﬁrst at stage 5 of the games and have the possibility to
apply to other banks in accordance with the list of banks selected in stage
2( D e p o s i t s - ﬁrst game) or at stage 4 (Loans-ﬁrst game). We maintain the
assumption that depositors are myopic so that the order in which they visit
the banks simply reﬂects the banks’ price attractiveness: rejected depositors
visit the banks oﬀering the next more attractive price, and so on, up to the
point where depositors are ﬁnally accepted or have no new bank to visit. We
assume that the rationing scheme in stage 5 is the following: depositors in
excess (with respect to the quantity of borrowers attracted by banks’ price
oﬀers) are rejected ﬁrst and once depositors have ﬁnished their movements
f r o mb a n kt ob a n ka ss p e c i ﬁed in the list, borrowers can in turn be rejected,
on the basis of the banks’ deﬁnitive amount of deposits. As already explained
even though they may be allowed to reapply this is meaningless as they will
necessarily be rejected by all the subsequent banks.
Depositors and borrowers are rejected through the so-called proportional
rationing scheme: banks select the rejected customers at random, so that
each agent has exactly the same probability of being rejected.
The multiple successive applications by depositors necessarily aﬀect the
sharing rules for deposits in ‘Deposits-ﬁrst’ and ‘Loans-ﬁrst’ games. Here is




































In the second case, although bank j oﬀers a less attractive price, it
can expect a positive amount of deposits, given that bank i with the most
attractive price may reject some depositors.
20Due to the dual nature of Bertrand competition in this game, if a bank
captures all borrowers it can eventually collect all deposits as well, regardless
the attractiveness of its deposit rate oﬀer.14 This feature was also the key
characteristic of ‘Loans-ﬁrst’ game in a single-application framework and it
is therefore not surprising that the outcome is similar.
Proposition 5 (SPNE with multiple applications and depositors ﬁrst re-
jected) The mobility of depositors, combined with the assumption that de-
positors are rationed by banks before borrowers, makes ‘Deposits-ﬁrst’ and
‘Loans-ﬁrst’ games converge on the same SPNE (rmin
D ,ER −1(1 + rmin
D )).
The oﬀ-equilibrium-path rates are unique and diﬀerent for the two games.
In the ‘Deposits-ﬁrst’ game, the NE in the credit subgames is r
ZUP
L (rD).
In the ‘Loans-ﬁrst’ game, the NE in the deposit subgames, if it exists, is
r
MC
D (rL) in case (i), and r
ZUP
D (rL) in case (ii).15
Multiple applications by depositors who are rejected ﬁrst weaken com-
petition on the deposit market, even in the case where the deposit market
is the ﬁrst market to be visited. In that case, not ﬁghting on the deposit
market is even the best strategy in order to be able to lead a more attractive
price policy on the credit market: a lower deposit rate allows to post a lower
credit rate. At the opposite, competition on the credit market becomes re-
ally decisive since a bank which has succeeded in attracting all borrowers
can expect to collect all deposits rejected by competitors.
Note that we could have derived the same results with a parallel rationing
scheme, where the depositors with the highest valuation are served ﬁrst.
When Sj









D then a bank getting
all the demand for credit is guaranteed to get all the deposit supply.
4.2 Multiple applications with excess borrowers rejected ﬁrst
Let us now brieﬂy turn to the case where borrowers can move from bank to
bank and are rejected before depositors. The rationing scheme in stage 5 is
14With an unattractive interest rate on deposits but all borrowers, the residual supply
that a bank can expect is
S
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With the same interest rate on deposits but all borrowers, the residual supply that a
bank can expect is
S
j










15The cases refer to Proposition 3.
21the following: borrowers in excess (with respect to the quantity of depositors
attracted by banks’ price oﬀers) are rejected ﬁrst and once borrowers have
ﬁnished their movements from bank to bank as speciﬁed in the list, deposi-
tors can in turn be rejected, on the basis of the banks’ deﬁnitive amount of
borrowers. Notice that in our imperfect information environment, the pro-
portional rationing scheme is the only way for the banks to proceed, since
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Competition in the credit market is signiﬁcantly weakened (even in the
game where the credit market is the ﬁrst market to be visited), since a non-
attractive price in the credit market can be rational: a bank with a non-
attractive price can expect to capture borrowers rejected by its competitors.
Competition in the deposit market becomes ﬁerce since an attractive price
in the deposit market, which provides the bank with all deposits, will be an
indirect way to attract all borrowers, whatever the rate posted on loans.
Mechanisms similar to ‘Deposits-ﬁrst’ game in a single-application frame-
work lead to the following conclusion:
Proposition 6 (SPNE with multiple applications and borrowers rejected
ﬁrst) In a framework where borrowers can move from bank to bank and are
rejected before depositors, both games converge on the SPNE (ER(˜ rL) − 1,
˜ rL). The oﬀ-equilibrium-path rates are unique and diﬀerent for the two
games. In the ‘Loans-ﬁrst’ game, the NE in the deposit subgames is r
ZUP
D (rL).
In the ‘Deposits-ﬁrst’ game, the NE in the credit subgames, if it exists, is ˜ rL
in case (i), r
MC
L (rD) in case (ii),and r
ZUP
L (rD) in case (iii).16
4.3 Discussion of the multiple-application framework
We have shown that the sequence in the price-setting of interest rates is
not the important factor determining in which direction the rates are driven
16The cases refer to Proposition 1.
22when the model allows multiple applications by borrowers and/or borrowers.
We discuss below our results, and relate them to the conclusions in the
existing literature.
a. Comparison with simultaneous interest rate oﬀers
The previous section has taught us that the order in which the banks visit
the markets is in fact not a key aspect of the games. The two games converge
to the same SPNE when we allow for mobility of agents (one market only, or
both markets). It is then not surprising that we ﬁnd here exactly the same
conclusions as those we would have reached by developing a game where the
credit and deposit rates are simultaneously posted by banks. As already
mentioned, when there is no mobility at all in a game with simultaneous of-
fers, Nash equilibria are all pairs (rD,r L) characterized by a zero unit proﬁt
on the positive slope of ER between rD = rmin
D and rD = ER(˜ rL) − 1.L e t
us introduce, in this framework with simultaneous price oﬀers, the possibil-
ity for rejected borrowers (rejected before depositors) to apply elsewhere.
Starting from any pair (rD,r L) (characterized by a zero unit proﬁto nt h e
upward-sloping part of ER)w i t hrD lower than ER(˜ rL)−1, there is now an
incentive to deviate through an increase in the deposit rate and an increase
in the credit rate (while generating a positive unitary proﬁt). The deviat-
ing bank collects all deposits and can then capture the borrowers rejected
by its competitors, who are totally deprived of funds. The unique NE is
(ER(˜ rL) − 1, ˜ rL). If we allow mobility only for depositors, we select the
unique NE (rmin
D ,ER −1(1 + rmin
D )). The reason is that now, for a higher
deposit rate, it is always proﬁtable to decrease both the credit rate and the
deposit rate, since by capturing all borrowers the bank is sure to capture
all depositors rejected by its competitors who are totally deprived of loan
applicants.
b. The role played by the non-commitment to serve all cus-
tomers
The major change we have introduced in the modelling of sequential com-
petition is the possibility to reject customers from the ﬁrst market, whereas
in Stahl [10], Freixas and Rochet, and the other models extending the origi-
nal framework, competition in the ﬁrst market implies serving all customers
in that market. Acceptance of all customers in a market results in a single
23application by these agents. Therefore, in Stahl [10],and in Freixas and
Rochet, intermediaries have to compete ﬁercely on the ﬁrst market, simply
because the customers in that market are not mobile. The order in the
competition matters only because of this commitment to the quantities in
the ﬁr s tm a r k e t .P u td i ﬀerently, if we impose that the middlemen in Stahl’s
framework always accept to buy the stocks from the producers, we would
ﬁnd that competition in the input market is ﬁerce regardless of the sequence
in the price-setting. This is also the reason why by imposing that banks ac-
cept all depositors, Repullo [7] and Yanelle [14] have results similar to our
‘Deposits-ﬁrst’ game in a single-application framework, although they study
a simultaneous competition framework.
In Stahl, the two sequential games eventually converge to the same out-
come, the Walrasian equilibrium, and therefore the author concludes that
the timing does not really matter. Stalh also shows that price—setting by
few middlemen in the input and output markets is equivalent to the case
where the price would be ﬁxed by a benevolent auctioneer. However, the
acceptance of all customers in the ﬁrst market generates opposite pressures
on the prices in the two models, upwards for the input-ﬁrst game and down-
wards for the output-ﬁrst game. A priori, there is no reason why the two
games would converge to the same outcome, as a bank technically can hold
more stocks than it can sell (more deposits than loans) but cannot pro-
vide more sales than stocks (no more loans than deposits). We understand
therefore that if the middlemen commit to serve all consumers, then the
downwards pressure on prices stops at the Walrasian equilibrium because
the stocks cannot be smaller than the demand. If the middlemen commit
to buy all goods from producers, the upwards pressure on the prices could
bring the prices beyong the Walrasian equilibrium, and possibly bringing a
diﬀerent outcome from the other game, as stocks can be larger than sales.
This does not occur in Stahl because there is no equilibrium in that case. In
the present paper, our assumption that banks can reject any excess allows
us to push the prices beyond or below the Walrasian equilibrium. We show
that price—setting by few ﬁnancial intermediaires in the deposit and loans
m a r k e t si sn o te q u i v a l e n tt ot h ec a s ew h e r et h ep r i c ew o u l db eﬁxed by a
benevolent auctioneer.
In Bracoud [3] we carry out the analysis of sequential competition among
ﬁnancial intermediaires when the latter commit to serve all depositors within
24an imperfect information context, à la Stiglitz and Weiss. This implies that,
contrary to Stahl [10], the unit receipt is non-monotonic with respect to
the price. The results are interesting as in cases where there is excess of
deposits at (ER(˜ rL) − 1, ˜ rL), the Walrasian outcome will emerge. Indeed,
if there is excess deposits at rD = g ER − 1, which used to be the highest
deposit rate in our present paper, then the expected proﬁti sn e g a t i v ea st h e
s u r p l u so fd e p o s i t sn o wh a st ob er e m u n e r a t e da sw e l l . T h eo b l i g a t i o nt o
pay all deposits, including those which will not be lent, therefore prevents
the banks from posting a deposit factor as high as g ER − 1, as was the
case in ‘Deposits-ﬁrst’ game. The Walrasian outcome will emerge instead.
However, and not surprisingly, credit rationing can also emerge in this new
framework, contrary to Stahl’s conclusions. The outcome in that case is the
same as in the present paper as the outcome is obviously not aﬀected by
the fact that all depositors are accepted. Since no depositor was rejected
anyway in the original game, total costs are unaﬀected, so that the deposit
rate can rise as far as before.
5C o n c l u s i o n
This paper develops sequential games of Bertrand competition in the deposit
and loan markets, where banks can also reject customers from the ﬁrst
market, and depositors and borrowers may be allowed to make multiple
applications. Our main conclusion is that the sequence in the price-setting
is not the key element to explain the direction in which the interest rates are
driven. Generally speaking, in a double Bertrand competition environment,
the interest rates are determined by the competition in the market for which
customers are less mobile, or for which mobility comes too late.
1. When depositors and borrowers can only apply to one bank, it be-
comes crucial for banks to capture customers in the ﬁr s tm a r k e tt o
have access to the second market. Competition is then particularly
ﬁerce in the ﬁrst market to be visited, and in that particular case the
timing of competition matters. When banks make their deposit rate
oﬀer before their credit rate oﬀer (‘Deposits-ﬁrst’ game), the Subgame
Perfect Nash equilibrium maximizes the banks’ expected return and
is located at the highest deposit rate compatible with proﬁtability.
When credit rate oﬀers are made before deposit rate oﬀers (‘Loans-
25ﬁrst’ game), competition drives the credit rate (and the deposit rate)
down to its lowest value compatible with banking activity.
2. When depositors or borrowers can apply to several banks, the timing
in the visits of the markets is no longer the key element. Both games
converge to the same outcome when they are characterized by the
same assumptions concerning mobility of customers and the rationing
scheme. If borrowers are the only agents to be allowed to apply else-
where when rejected, or if they are rejected before depositors, Bertrand
competition in both deposit and credit markets gives the outcome of
the ‘Deposits-ﬁrst’ game in the single-application framework, the de-
posit rate being driven up to its highest value. On the other hand,
if depositors are the only agents to be allowed to move from bank to
bank, or if they are rejected before borrowers, Bertrand competition in
both deposit and credit markets generates the outcome of the ‘Loans-
ﬁrst’ game in a single-application environment, and the credit and the
deposit rates are driven down to low levels.
These results show that in the original paper by Stahl [10] on competition
among middlemen in the goods market, the prices where not driven by the
sequence in the price-setting but simply by the assumption that middlemen
commit to serve all customers in the ﬁrst market.
Even though the timing of the competition is not a key element in the
determination of interest rates, the present paper has underlined the exis-
tence of two possible alternative equilibria, depending on which side of the
market it is more important to capture. We can therefore express some
concern that so many papers in the credit maket literature overlook the
modelling of competition in the deposit market. This paper has illustrated
that the commonly-referred-to result of Stiglitz and Weiss [11] that asym-
metric information explains credit rationing could not be derived from just
any model with asymmetric information. In order to generate credit ra-
tioning due to asymmetric information, competition in the deposit market
must be dominant such that an upwards pressure on interest rates takes
place. We emphasize that credit rationing might not always be the conse-
quence of asymmetric information, but might sometimes simply result from
ﬁerce competition in the credit market.
The present paper contributes to a better understanding of the forces
that are in play in an environment of double Bertrand competition. Many
26other games should be examined in order to gain complete insight into the
modelling of Bertrand competition in the deposit and credit markets. For
example, it would be interesting to show the inﬂuence that strategic borrow-
ers and/or depositors (whom we so far assumed to be myopic and insensitive
to the probability to be a victim of rationing) could have on our results. The
rationing schemes in this paper are exogenously given and a natural exten-
sion would be to endogeneize these schemes. Another possible development
would be to introduce the interbank market, which may change the way
the model deals with the extreme situation in which a bank has all deposits
whereas its competitor has all loans applications. This paper provides a
basis for extensions in these directions.
27Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
1. For subgames where the banks post the same deposit rate, lower than
or equal to ER(˜ rL)−1,
• A NE is necessarily composed of identical credit rates. A bank
with a larger credit rate would be left without activity and then
would have an incentive to decrease its credit rate to attract some
borrowers.
• A NE cannot exhibit a negative expected proﬁt( ER(rL) ≤ 1+
rD). Indeed, one bank with negative expected proﬁtw o u l dt h e n
have the incentive to increase the credit rate to lose all its bor-
rowers and thus give up banking activities.
• A credit rate located on the downward-sloping portion of the ER
curve cannot be a NE either. A decrease in the credit rate would
then raise the expected return ER and would either increase the
quantity lent when there was an excess of deposits or leave the
quantity unchanged if the deposits were binding. As a result, the
expected proﬁt would unambiguously increase.
• The above arguments leave us with the credit rates located on
the upward-sloping portion of ER,a n da b o v er
ZUP
L . In addition,
deposit rationing (i.e., rL >r
MC
L ) with a strictly positive ex-
pected proﬁt cannot be a NE. With an excess of deposits, a bank
has an incentive to decrease the posted credit rate to attract all
borrowers and can thus signiﬁcantly increase the quantity lent.
The global expected proﬁt of the deviating bank is then increased
(EΠ(rL −²,rD) >E Π(rL,r D)), even if the expected unit proﬁti s
slightly decreased ([ER(rL −²)−(1+rD)] < [ER(rL)−(1+rD)])
on the upward-sloping portion of the ER curve. This is due to









). The only case where it is not pos-
sible to deviate from a situation with excess deposits is when the
decrease in the credit rate would result in a negative unit proﬁt.
T h i si st h ec a s ew h e nw es t a r tf r o maz e r o - p r o ﬁtc o n ﬁguration
located on the upward-sloping portion of the ER curve, i.e., r
ZUP
L .
28• Finally let us show that it is unproﬁtable to deviate from a situ-
ation where credit oﬀers are identical, higher than r
ZUP
L ,l o c a t e d
on the upward-sloping portion of ER, and characterized by credit
rationing or market clearing. A decrease in the credit rate would
decrease the expected return and the attraction of all borrowers
would not raise the quantity of loans since the supply of deposits
is binding. Such a deviation would unambiguously be unprof-
itable. An increase in the credit rate is not proﬁtable either,
because the deviating bank would then be deprived of borrowers.
2. Let us now turn to the constellation where one deposit rate is strictly
higher than the others. The bank with the most attractive price at-
tracts all deposits and is thus the only one to have access to the credit
market. The equilibrium credit rate is then the monopolistic rate. The
latter cannot be on the downward-sloping portion of ER, since a de-
crease in the credit rate raises the unit expected proﬁta n dp o t e n t i a l l y
the amount lent if the demand was binding. The monopolistic rate
cannot be characterized by credit rationing either: when the supply
of funds is binding, the total expected proﬁt is increased through an
i n c r e a s ei nt h ec r e d i tr a t es i n c et h ea m o u n tl e n tr e m a i n st h es a m ea n d
the unit expected proﬁt is unambiguously increased on the upward-
sloping portion of ER. It follows that the equilibrium in the subgame
is ˜ rL in case (i), is located somewhere between r
MC
L and ˜ rL in case
(ii), and between r
ZUP
L and ˜ rL in case (iii). For the last two cases,
the equilibrium is the credit rate which equates marginal revenue and
marginal cost, taking the demand for credit to be the amount lent.
Proof of Proposition 2
• At equilibrium, it is impossible for a bank to post a deposit rate lower
than others’. It would have no funds at all and would be compelled to
give up banking activities. It would then have an incentive to deviate
by oﬀering the same deposit rate as the most attractive bank.
• It is not possible for banks to post a deposit rate higher than ER(˜ rL)−
1 either, as this generates a negative proﬁt. Some bank would then
always have an incentive to post a deposit rate lower than the others’
to give up lending activities by a lack of funds.
29• It is not possible, either, that banks post a deposit rate strictly lower
than ER(˜ rL) − 1. Indeed, one bank would then have the incentive to
oﬀer a slightly higher deposit rate in order to capture the whole deposit
market and reach a monopoly position in the credit market. Even if
the deviating bank did not post the monopolistic optimal credit rate
at stage 3 but upholds the credit rate which was a NE in the subgame
where all banks oﬀered a deposit rate lower than ER(˜ rL)−1,i tc o u l d
increase its expected proﬁtb ys i m p l yb e n e ﬁtting from a jump in the
quantity lent, which more than oﬀsets the loss due to the inﬁnitesimal
increase in the unit cost of funds:
EΠ(rL,r D + ²)=[ ER(rL) − (1 +rD + ²)]min{DL(rL),S D(rD + ²)}
>








With the monopolistic credit rate the increase of the proﬁtw o u l db e
even larger.
• Let us check, ﬁnally, that there is no proﬁtable deviation from rD =
ER(˜ rL) − 1 (with the subgame equilibrium at rL =˜ rL). An increase
in the deposit rate would entail a negative expected proﬁt, whereas a
decrease would deprive the deviating bank of its funds.
Proof of Proposition 3
1. We begin the proof with the subgames where all posted credit rates
are the same.
• The deposit oﬀers have to be the same for all banks in a NE. A
bank posting a lower deposit rate would be deprived of deposits
and would thus have an incentive to raise its deposit rate to have
deposits and activity.
• A deposit rate which would lead to a negative expected proﬁtf o r
the banks, i.e. rD >r
ZUP
D , cannot be a NE. One bank would have
an incentive to decrease the deposit rate to have no deposits and
thus give up banking activities.
• A deposit rate generatinga depositdeﬁcit (i.e., rD <r MC
D )c a n n o t
be a NE if associated with a strictly positive unit proﬁt. With
30an excess of credit applicants, a bank has an incentive to increase
the posted deposit rate so as to attract all depositors and thus
signiﬁcantly increase the quantity lent. The global expected proﬁt
of the deviating bank is thus increased, even if the expected unit
proﬁt is slightly decreased. The only case where it is not possible
to deviate from a situation with a deposit deﬁcit is when we start
f r o mas i t u a t i o nw i t haz e r ou n i tp r o ﬁt . T h ei n c r e a s ei nt h e
deposit rate would then result in a negative unit proﬁt.
• L e tu sn o ws h o wt h a tt h e r ei sn op r o ﬁtable deviation from a situa-
tion where the deposit rate is higher than the market-clearing one
and lower than r
ZUP
D . An increase in the deposit rate would be
useless since the demand for credit is binding whereas a decrease
in the deposit rate would deprive the bank of deposits.
2. Let us now turn to the constellation where one credit rate is lower
than the others. All borrowers choose this bank which therefore has a
monopolistic position in the deposit market. This bank is thus able to
post the monopolistic deposit rate. This rate cannot be characterized
by deposit rationing, since an increase in the deposit rate would leave
the quantity lent unchanged (since the demand for credit is binding)
but would proﬁtably raise the expected return. The rate is chosen in
such a way that it equates marginal revenue and marginal cost, taking
the supply of deposits to be the quantity lent.
Proof of Proposition 4
• It is not possible, at equilibrium, for one bank to post a higher credit
rate than the others. This bank would have no loan applicants at all
and would have to give up banking activities. It would thus have an
incentive to deviate by oﬀering the same credit rate as the others in
order to get activity.






, as associated deposit rate in the subgame
would have to be not higher than rmin
D (to avoid negative expected
proﬁt), implying an absence of funds to ﬁnance loans.






. Indeed, one bank would have an incentive to oﬀer a
slightly lower credit rate to capture the whole loan market and induce
a jump in the quantity lent, which more than oﬀsets the loss due to the
inﬁnitesimal decrease in the unit return. This is proﬁtable even if the
deviating bank does not post the optimal monopolistic deposit rate.
This rules out in particular the credit rates on the downward-portion
of the expected return ER.




L , it is necessarily higher than or equal to rZUP
D = rmin
D .
We are therefore in case (i) or (ii) of Proposition 3 and the optimal
deposit rate is rmin
D , which entails credit rationing (if rMC
D >r min
D )o r
market clearing (if rMC
D = rmin
D ). This last case is very fortuitous and
credit rationing is more likely.
Proof of Proposition 5
Let us begin with ‘Deposits-ﬁrst’ game where the deposit market is the
ﬁr s tm a r k e tt ob ev i s i t e d .
1. Credit market subgames
• The credit subgames where all banks oﬀer the same deposit rate
now exhibit only one NE, r
ZUP
L , characterized by a zero unit
proﬁt, as in the standard Bertrand competition without capacity
constraints.
Let us start from our results in Proposition 1 where we had h
r
ZUP
L , ˜ rL
i








for case (ii), and r
ZUP
L
for case (iii). We now rule out as equilibria all situations of pos-
itive expected proﬁt. Indeed, if we start with a positive proﬁt
(i.e., rL >r
ZUP
L ), any bank has an incentive to post a lower
credit rate to attract all borrowers. Although deposits captured
by the deviating bank at the beginning of the game are binding
before deviation, this bank will eventually capture the deposi-
tors rejected by the other bank totally deprived of borrowers and
collect all deposits. In a way, the capacity constraint is automat-
ically relaxed and then a discrete jump in the quantities takes
place which more than oﬀs e t st h ed e c r e a s ei nER.
32• The credit market subgames where one bank oﬀers a higher de-
posit rate than its competitor (rD >r 0
D) now surprisingly lead
to no activity for the most attractive bank, rather than to a
monopolistic outcome as previously in Proposition 1. Its com-






) in order to get all borrowers and











L is the minimum between r
ZUP
L − ² and the monopolistic
credit rate. The bank with the lowest deposit rate captures both
markets and generates a positive proﬁt.
2 .D e p o s i tm a r k e ta n dS P N E
Starting from a subgame where all banks post the same deposit rate
strictly higher than rmin
D , necessarily leading to a zero expected proﬁt
since the associated NE credit factor is rZUP
L , any bank has an incen-
tive to decrease the deposit rate, since this deviation gives a positive
proﬁtw i t ha l lc u s t o m e r s .Ad e v i a t i o nt h r o u g ha ni n c r e a s ei nt h ed e -
posit rate would lead to no activity at all and is consequently not a







Let us now turn to ‘Loans-ﬁrst’ game, where the credit market is the
ﬁr s tm a r k e tt ob ev i s i t e d .
1 .D e p o s i tm a r k e ts u b g a m e s
• Subgames exhibiting the same credit rate for all banks are af-
fected by the mobility of depositors in the sense that now a de-
crease in the deposit rate may be proﬁtable, since the deviating
bank can potentially beneﬁt from the rejection of funds by its









for case (i) and r
ZUP
D for case (ii). Any situation
characterized by deposit rationing (rD >r MC
D ) is now challenged
17A deviation through a decrease in the deposit rate is not proﬁtable if the competitor
always conducts a retaliation policy. In such a limit case, any pair (rL;rD) characterized
by a zero expected proﬁti saS P N E .
33by a cut in the deposit rate. By choosing a deposit rate such
that it remains higher than rMC
D , the deviating bank guarantees
that the eﬀective quantity is still given by its demand for credit.
























2.T h i s r e -
sults in the residual supply to be larger than 1
2SD(rD −²) and in
spite of a less attractive price, the eﬀective quantity lent is still
1
2DL(rL). As the expected unit proﬁt is unambiguously increased
through the fall in the deposit rate, the deviating bank’s expected
proﬁt rises. In case (i), the only potential NE in the subgame is
thus rMC
D . However its existence, as for r
ZUP
D in case (ii), is not
guaranteed. A decrease in the deposit rate could still threaten
them. A deviation through a decrease in the deposit rate from
rMC
D leads to a residual supply exactly equal to 1
2SD(rD −²) and
is the eﬀective quantity the deviating bank can lend. We face two
opposite eﬀects: on the one hand a decrease in the quantity lent,
a n do nt h eo t h e ra ni n c r e a s ei nt h ee x p e c t e du n i tp r o ﬁt through a
fall in the deposit rate. If the rise in unit proﬁtm o r et h a no ﬀsets
the decrease in the quantity, the deviation is proﬁtable and rMC
D
is not a NE.
• For subgames such that one credit rate is lower than the others,
the equilibrium deposit rate is again the monopolistic one, as in
the original game. The bank which has captured all the borrowers
is not even compelled to post an attractive deposit rate, since it
has the guarantee of collecting the deposits from the other banks
anyway.
2. Credit market and SPNE






a n dw h e r et h e r ee x i s t sa ne q u i l i b r i u mi nt h e
subgame, any bank has an incentive to decrease the credit rate. The







34Proof of Proposition 6
Let us begin with ‘Loans-ﬁrst’ game where the credit market is the ﬁrst
market to be visited. We give less details than for the previous proposition
since the logic of this proof is equivalent to that of ‘Deposits-ﬁrst’ game with
mobility of depositors.
1 .D e p o s i tm a r k e ts u b g a m e s
• The subgames where all banks oﬀer the same credit rate now ex-
hibit only one NE, r
ZUP
D , characterized by a zero unit proﬁt. Let






for case (i) and r
ZUP
D for case (ii). From the continuum of NE,
we can now rule out all situations leading to a strictly positive
unit proﬁt. Indeed, from a situation of positive unit proﬁt( rD
<r
ZUP
D ) any bank can deviate through an increase in the de-
posit rate. Although it faces a lack of demand for loans at the
beginning of the subgame (rD >r MC
D ), the deviating bank will
eventually capture the borrowers rejected by the other banks to-
tally deprived of deposits. The consequent jump in the quantity
will more than oﬀset the inﬁnitesimal decrease in the expected
unit proﬁt.
• The subgames where one bank oﬀers a lower credit rate than its
competitor (rL <r:0
L) now surprisingly lead to no activity for
the most attractive bank, rather than to a monopolistic outcome
as in Proposition 3. Its competitor can always overbid it in the
deposit market and gets all deposits and all borrowers. The bank
proﬁt maximizing NE in the subgame is rD = r
ZUP
D and r :0
D is
the minimum between r
ZUP
D and the monopolistic deposit rate.
2. Credit market and SPNE
Starting from a subgame where all banks post the same credit rate,
strictly lower than ˜ rL, necessarily leading to a zero expected proﬁt
since the associated NE deposit factor is r
ZUP
D , any bank has an in-
centive to increase the credit rate, since this deviation always gives a
positive proﬁt. The only SPNE is then (ER(˜ rL);˜ rL).
Let us now turn to ‘Deposits-ﬁrst’ game, where the deposit market is
the ﬁr s tm a r k e tt ob ev i s i t e d .
351. Credit market subgames
• Subgames exhibiting the same deposit rate for all banks are af-
fected by the mobility of borrowers in the sense that now an
increase in the credit rate may be proﬁtable since the deviating
bank can potentially beneﬁt from the rejection of loan applicants





L , ˜ rL
i









case (ii), and r
ZUP
L f o rc a s e( i i i ) . W er u l eo u ts i t u a t i o n sw h e r e
there is credit rationing since an increase in the credit rate is
proﬁtable. In case (i) the only equilibrium is ˜ rL. For case (ii) the
only potential Nash equilibrium in the subgame is r
MC
L ,b u ti t s
existence is not guaranteed. In case (iii) r
ZUP
L is the only potential
NE but its existence is not guaranteed either.
• For subgames such that one deposit rate is higher than the other,
the Nash equilibrium is again the monopolistic one, as in the
original game, regardless of the behaviour of competitor.
2 .D e p o s i tm a r k e ta n dS P N E
Starting from a case where all banks post the same deposit rate, lower
than ˜ rD, and where there exists an equilibrium in the subgame, any
bank has an incentive to increase the deposit rate. The only SPNE is
thus the same as previously, i.e., (E (˜ rL), ˜ rL).
36References
[1] Bhattacharya, S. and Thakor A.V., 1993, Contemporary Banking The-
ory, Journal of Financial Intermediation, 3, 2-50.
[2] Bracoud, F., 1995, A Re-Assessment of Stiglitz and Weiss’ Model of
Credit Rationing under Asymmetric Information, mimeo, Chapter 1 in
PhD dissertation.
[3] Bracoud, F., 1999, Bertrand Competition for Deposits and Loans under
Asymmetric Information: Stiglitz and Weiss Revisited, mimeo, Liver-
pool Research Papers in Economics, Finance and Accounting, 9901.
[4] Freixas, X. and Rochet, J.C., 1997, Microeconomics of Banking, (Cam-
bridge: MIT Press).
[5] Gottardi, P and Yanelle, M -O., 1997, Financial innovation and com-
petition among intermediaries, in Banking Competition and Risk Man-
agement, ed. Gabriella Chiesa, Roma.
[6] Hellwig, M., 1987, Theory of Competition in Markets with Adverse
Selection, European Economic Review, 31, 319-325.
[7] Repullo, R., 1986, “A Simple Model of Interest Deregulation”, mimeo,
London School of Economics and Bank of Spain.
[8] Santomero, A.M., 1984, Modeling the Banking Firm - A Survey, Journal
of Money, Credit, and Banking , 16, 576-602 .
[9] Spulber, D. F., 1999, Market Microstructure - Intermediaries and the
Theory of the Firm , (Cambridge: MIT Press).
[10] Stahl, D.O., 1988, Bertrand Competition for Inputs and Walrasian Out-
comes, American Economic Review , 78, 189-201.
[11] Stiglitz, J. and Weiss, A., 1981, Credit Rationing in Markets with Im-
perfect Information, American Economic Review , 71, 393-410.
[12] Toolselma, L., 2001, Reserve Requirements and Double Bertrand Com-
petition among Banks, Applied Economics Letters, 8, 291-293.
[13] Vives, X., 1999, Oligopoly Pricing - Old Ideas and New Tools, (Cam-
bridge: MIT Press).
37[14] Yanelle, M-O., 1988, On the Theory of Intermediation, mimeo, unpub-
lished PhD dissertation. Department of Economics, Bonn University
[15] Yanelle, M-O., 1989, The Strategic Analysis of Intermediation, Euro-
pean Economic Review, 33, 294-301.
[16] Yanelle, M-O., 1997, Banking Competition and Market Eﬃciency, Re-
view of Economic Studies, 64, 215-239
[17] Yanelle, M.-O., 1996, Can Intermediaries Replace the Walrasian Auc-










Figure 1: The expected return function
39 









D r   L ER r 
+
_ 
Figure 2: The demand for credit and the supply of deposits
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